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Introduction 
The strategic changes that have taken place in Europe since the 
summer of 1989 are momentous. Following the opening of the Berlin 
Wall, Germany became unifed: the Federal Republic swallowed the 
German Democratic Republic. All these European events have produced 
a major strategic change for Denmark and therefore in the 
country • s significance for the United Kingdom. Fu.rthermore, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war has enveloped 
European countries in a major conflict. The United Kingdom has been 
an important participant ~n the multinational effort to thwart the 
designs of Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The crisis has also brought a 
response from Denmark. The country attended as an observer at the 
August Ministerial Council of the Western European Union and decided 
to send a corvette to participate in the multilateral naval 
blockade. This may seem a small contribution but for a country with 
no history of •out-of-area• defence involvement, with little 
capability for such a role, and with a tradition of political 
opposition to the extension of military activity, this move 
represents a major shift in Danish understanding of its security. 
Danish forces have participated in UN peacekeeping operations, but 
these fulfil a policing role for agreed settlements or ceasefires 
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and have been under United Nations' control. The 1990 Gulf 
operation, though sanctioned by Security Council Resolutions, is one 
of enforcement and does not operate under the order of any organ of 
the UN. 
This study will consider the debate in Denmark about the future of 
its security in the light of the new situation in Europe and - to a 
lesser extent (because the ramifications are not so clear) - of the 
Kuwaiti War. 
The first point to note is that the debate in Denmark, especially 
when the nature of external changes and their implications for 
Demark are born in mind, has .been limited. In 1988 an all-party 
Defence Commission was established to examine the basis for Danish 
defence and security into the 1990s. The Commission produced its 
report in early 1989 and this caused some controversy and discussion 
within the Danish defence-political community. However, the level 
and breadth of agreement was the notable factor, rather than the 
disharmony that had charaterised the defence debate of the 1982-88 
period. 
The second point is that the momentous events seem, if anything, to 
have stifled political discussion within Denmark. This is partly a 
realisation that Denmark has a very limited ability to affect the 
turn of events in Europe, let alone those in the Middle East. It is 
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also perhaps a reflection of the satisfaction by the broad spectrum 
of political life with the consensus represented by the Defence 
Commission's Report and with a number of developments within NATO 
since the beginning of 1990. 
Thirdly, the political reshaping of Europe could be expected to 
offer - almost for the first time in forty years - a number of 
alternative security policies for small central European states. 
While these have perhaps made some impression on the fringe of 
Danish politics, they have not been taken up by the mainstream as 
alternatives to current Danish security policy. Some of the ideas 
may be seen as possibly supplementing the existing line rather than 
displacing it. 
What alternatives are on offer in the current Danish security 
debate? Where might they take Danish defence in the coming decade 
and what support might they have? 
Consideration will be given to two strands of thinking that emerged 
with the Defence Commission's Report, but were soon overtaken by 
events. The view of the minority report from the Commission will 
also be examined as it represents a small, but vocal, opinion in the 
defence debate. However, the main answer to the question 'which way 
forward for Danish security?' can be found not so much in any Danish 
document but more in the Declaration from the London NATO Summit of 
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July 1990. Elements therein addressing the Danish debate will be 
outlined. Finally, alternative views will be examined. In looking 
at the options for Danish defence, some estimation will be made of 
the political support for the various views and of their possible 
consequences for the United Kingdom defence relationship with 
Denmark. 
In summary, the eight sets of answers, that are sketched out below, 
to the 'which way forward?' question involve three (i)-(iii), that 
resulted from the Defence CommissiOn's considerations, one 
mainstream answer based on the London Declaration (iv), and four 
alternative scenarios, (v)-(viii), some of which could be seen as 
supplementing (iv) at one stage or another. The eight 'options' -
which, it should be stressed, are not necessarily mutually 
incompatible - are typified by the following nomenclatures: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
the status-quo minus: a continuation 
situation but with CFE cuts; 
of the present 
'just-in-case': an emphasis placed on the need to cope with 
uncertainty; 
the Alternative European Security System: 
nuclear-free, bloc-free Europe that is less 
Atlantic links; 
moving to 
dependent 
a 
on 
the London Declaration European Security System: managing a 
move from NATO's collective defence to a new all-Europe 
system that still has a strong Atlantic link and the nuclear 
deterrent; 
a European collective security system: moving from NATO 
collective security to all-European collective defence; 
armed neutrality: an alternative in the absence of a wider 
European solution; 
no military defence: a near-pacifist answer; 
seeking environmental security: redefining the problem. 
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These will now be considered in turn. 
(i) The option Status quo minus is fairly well reflected in the 
recommendations of the Defence Commission (1). The scenario is one 
where there is still a significant coventional - and other - threat 
from the Soviet Union, though one where the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) agreement means cuts in the numbers of troops, tanks 
and fighter aircraft. This would mean a broadly unaltered structure 
for the Danish armed forces, with the expectation of a 10-15% 
reduction in certain weapons and systems as the CFE agreement was 
implemented in the 1990s. Allied reinforcement would still be 
needed, though as the threat of surprise attack was tackled by the 
successor to CFE, rapid reinforcement would become less of a 
military necessity. Also heavily armed formations would be affected 
by CFE cuts and more lightly-armed formations such as the UKMF could 
increase in utility. The Danish Air Force would be rationalised, 
though reduced in size, and Denmark would still depend on Allied air 
forces - including the RAF - to maintain control of its airspace and 
give ground support in a war. 
This scenario has been overtaken by events, most noticeabl:;- the 
rapid economic and political unification of Germany and the collapse 
of Communist governments in the East European members of the Warsaw 
Pact. The new governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
have taken a negative approach towards the Warsau Pact, helping 
further to diminish the credibility among Hestern public opinion of 
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threat scenarios that still involve a massive attack by the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation on NATO. At the same time, this solution did 
not address many of the rising security concerns - unrest in East 
European states, ethnic violence in Europe, the possible 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, out-of-area disputes that 
impinge on Europe - that could affect states such as Denmark. Thus, 
just taking the benefits of the CFE agreement is seen as an 
unsatisfactory formula for the future security of Denmark. It 
neither assuages those with a thirst for a 'peace dividend' nor 
offers all-round security in a post-Cold War world. This option by 
itself has therefore attracted little political support. 
(ii) The 'just-in-case• option is also a basically cautious one and 
again can be seen in the majority report of the Defence Commission 
(2). Here, the enemy is not so much the Warsaw Pact but uncertainty 
itself. Events may develop satisfactorily: the two Superpowers may 
agree on further arms control; the level of armament in Europe may 
be reduced and its 'offensive' nature tempered; the unification of 
Germany may progress without a hitch; reform may continue in the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand, everything could unravel: the CFE 
and START process may falter (even at the stage of ratification -
and not necessarily in the US Senate); and the Soviet Union 
' could either revert to neo-Stalinism or descend into chaos. The 
important point here is not the likelihood of any of these outcomes 
but the uncertainty as to where along the continuum Europe might be 
in five or ten years, or indeed the nature of the continuum. 
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The argument is then made that the NATO countries should maintain at 
leastthe greater part of their present armed forces (CFE apart), 
just in case the Soviet Union does not carry out unilateral cuts and 
withdrawals already announced; and in case unforeseen threats to the 
West suddenly arise. This view differs from the 'status quo-minus' 
approach insofar as it accepts that, at least for the near future, 
the nature of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has changed and that 
' 
the traditional view of the main threat to NATO is no longer valid. 
However, the.current response should stress the contingent and place 
emphasis on flexibility of forces. NATO forces should be re-
structured in order to wean them away from expecting a massive 
Warsaw Pact attack and to lead them more towards either meeting a 
number of smaller yet unspecified threats or being able to 
reconstruct themselves should the traditional 'Soviet threat' (or 
something like it) re-emerge. 
In this scenario, Denmark, and its Allies - should no longer be 
planning for the 'Battle of Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein' but 
should be participating in the reconstruction of NATO's strategy and 
operations. These would have to take account of CFE cuts and the 
willingness of NATO members to reduce troop levels below such CFE 
figures. It would have to recognise the new political - and 
military - situation in Germany. It would also accept the public 
demand for a 'peace dividend', though would warn that this may be 
smaller and later than expected. This viewpoint would try to 
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balance the cuts brought about by CFE ·with those consequent on 
budgetary squeezes, yet still provide NATO with a rounded capability 
to meet a number of possible threats. 
The ability of the RAF to operate over Danish airspace - and to use 
hardened shelters in Denmark - would still make sense in terms of 
defending the United Kingdom home base as well as contributing to a 
NATO force able to meet a number of challenges. However, the UKMF's 
reinforcement of the Baltic Approaches, especially Jutland and 
Schleswig-Holstein, would have to be seen in a new context. One 
suggestion that takes into account many of the changes and pressures 
mentioned above is contained in the recent work of Greenwood and 
Canby, which deals primarily with the situation in Germany. These 
authors suggest that future military dispositions must incorporate: 
A. Forward-deployed territorial defence formations (with air 
support) to police borders and conduct surveillance in peacetime and 
to provide the initial response against aggression. These would be 
based in Eastern Germany and would be supplemented by ground-based 
air defence and airborne warning, surveillance and control. 
B. Back-up mobilisable "shield" brigades, situated to the west of 
the 'A'-type units and ready to augment them. These ground troops 
(with the necessary tactical air power) would be armed and trained 
for 'screen and parry actions' and for 'opportunistic counter-
attacks •. They could include a number of multi-national 
contributions. 
\I 
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C. 11 Sword 11 brigades of mobile operational reserves, with air assets, 
to counter-attack or deliver decisive counter-strokes. 
D. Logistic and support units austerely configured in peacetime but 
ready for transformation into 'a more robust set-up' in a crisis or 
war. (3) 
Such a configuration of forces would transform the defence not only 
of Germany, but of the Schleswig-Holstein-Jutland area, so 
intimately tied to that defence. Perhaps a permanently deployed 
'UKMF', with a self-contained brigade structure, together with 
active or mobilised Danish and German brigades, could provide one of 
the "shield" formations for use more or less in the area where the 
force currently operates. It either has or could acquire many of 
the requirements for participation in such a multinational formation 
and could act as a model for part of the continuing British 
contribution to a NATO defence of Germany 'just-in-case' a threat 
emerges in Europe. 
This outcome provides an answer to the question 'whither Danish 
defence?' (indeed to the wider question about NATO defence) that 
makes some military sense and takes into account the wider subject 
of political change in Europe. However, it is primarily a military 
solution and, as such, may only partly address certain political 
sensitivities. 
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For example, such an approach may find political support slipping 
away from it, as it appears that a threat from the East will not re-
emerge. Public opinion may increasingly find military scenarios 
unrealistic and prefer a cut in defence expenditure to caution. 
There is one possible element that could make the Danish public -
contrary to that of other NATO states - not so eager to reject the 
'just-in-case' stance. From the 1840s to 1945, a strong Germany to 
the south of Denmark has created problems for Danish security. It 
might be seen as judicious not only to keep the newly-unified 
Germany in an active NATO structure but also to contribute to the 
division of Alliance labour - along with other non-German allies -
so that the defence burden in Central Europe and the surrounding 
seas does not fall exclusively on German shoulders. Danish and 
British forces would continue to reinforce Germany, with the result 
that the two countries would have a voice in the disposition of 
security in the area and the traditional adversaries of Germany 
(such as Poland and the Soviet Union) would be more reassured that 
German defence forces are well and truly tied into the NATO 
framework. 
Secondly, the above solution would need to have a political 
framework within which questions such as command structures and 
reinforcement would be solved. These are two vital elements in 
Danish defence. The Baltic Approaches Command has played - and 
continues to play - an important role in the Danish contribution to 
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NATO. Should BALTAP disappear under any new plans, NATO would be 
deprived of its one prime example of active multilateral, military 
co-operation; the framework for the Danish reinforcement of Northern 
Germany would be dismantled, perhaps placing at risk Danish public 
support for having such troops available; and there would be a gap 
between the Central Front (benefiting from CFE cuts) and a Norway 
still concerned about the maritime strength of the Soviet Union to 
its north. 
At first sight, this option provides the context for Allied 
reinforcement of Denmark and prestocking of materiel there. Indeed, 
the move to a multinational formation of forces throughout NATO's 
central area could mean increased prestocking in Denmark and a 
reconsideration of Denmark's rejection of the permanent presence of 
foreign troops on Danish soil. But for this to obtain public and 
political acceptance, a perception of the wider security future of 
Europe is needed. 
Thirdly, the changes in the military dispositions in and around 
Danish frontiers consequent to this option, only attempt to deal 
with threats within Europe. They do not address out-of-area 
conflicts (such as that in the Gulf) which, it could be argued, 
might be NATO countries' main concern during the 1990s. The stress 
on flexible forces may help to contribute to a response, but a 
political agreement is needed on what NATO states should do - a. d 
how - when threatened by out-of-area crises. 
:: 
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Because this option does not provide a political framework for a 
future defence policy, it has not, by itself, attracted substantial 
support from the Danish political spectrum. However, it has 
provided the military backdrop for the London Declaration option 
(see (iv) below). 
(iii) The Alternative European Security System was outlined by Pelle 
Voigt of the Socialist Peoples Party in his minority report in the 
Defence Commisssion's Report. In this, he criticised the 
assumptions that NATO membership was a valid prerequesite for the 
coming twenty years, that other NATO members would be willing to 
take up tasks from Danish defence under the guise of role 
specialisation, that 'rationalisation' was not aimed at moving to 
more appropriate forms of defence, and that a Nordic nuclear-weapon-
free was not a problem to be dealt with in a serious fashion.(4) 
Voigt advanced the concept of a new European security system built 
on mutual security at a low level of armaments, which would replace 
the existing blocs. This could be achieved in phases, first by an 
alteration of the blocs' most aggressive strategies and doctrines, 
the adoption of a unilateral rejection of first-use of nuclear 
weapons, and a reforming of forces into a completely defensive 
direction; then a gradual loosening of bloc-ties such as the 
integrated command structure and BALTAP Command; finally a 
unilateral or bilateral dissolution of the blocs as part of natural 
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process. He forsaw a greater emphasis by Denmark on regional 
groupings such as those in the Nordic region and the Baltic, and 
less reliance on the Atlantic link.(5) 
In his remarks on Denmark's relations with NATO, Voigt pointed out 
that reinforcement policy - as Danish nuclear policy - depended on 
the decision-makers taking action in a crisis that could lead to the 
introduction of reinforcements and, eventually, nuclear weapons into 
the country. Instead he recommended making Denmark a permanent 
nuclear-free area, within a Nordic zone, and adopting a military 
structure that broke with reinforcement and military integration in 
NATO. Furthermore, Voigt considered that as the only form of 
military operation in which Denmark might particpate in the near 
future would be UN peacekeeping, emphasis should be away from heavy 
and offensive weaponry and more on close air defence, and on 
land-based defence rather than on aircraft and expensive surface 
vessels. The issues still to be addressed from the Socialist 
Peoples Party viewpoint were the new form of co-operative 
structures in Europe to replace the blocs; the move from a military 
to a political organisation for NATO; the reduction of Danish 
defence and the move to alternative security aims; the change to a 
defensive direction for Danish defence with duties for civil society 
and UN peacekeeping; and making defence 'disarmament capable'.(6) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,11 
b 
I 
I 
-14-
The outcome of this option for the United Kingdom's relationship 
with Denmark would be drastic, especially as Voigt recommended 
breaking with reinforcement and NATO military integration. No need 
would be seen for the UKMF or, presumably, air reinforcements and 
the nuclear-free policy would preclude visits by Royal Navy ships if 
the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or nuclear 
weapons on board these vessels was maintained by the United Kingdom 
government. The option anyhow has little, if any, support in the 
main political parties outside the Socialist Peoples Party. 
(v) The London Declaration Security System speaks to many Danish 
needs. 
The aim of the NATO leaders, meeting in London in July 1990, was to 
move toward a new European security system that could guarantee a 
peaceful and secure Europe at a lower level of armament than at 
present. The Atlantic link and the strength of the European 
Communities were stressed, but the Ministerial Declaration also 
looked to the eventual prominence of CSCE in setting the standards 
of free societies, which would be overseen by Pan-European 
institutions (7). Meanwhile, a joint NATO-Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation declaration that they were no longer adversaries was 
suggested (#6) and taken up at the CSCE Paris Summit in November 
1990. Emphasis was placed on the success of the CFE and CSBM 
negotiations - with further talks on manpower limitations (#12) - to 
f 
I 
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limit the offensive capability of conventional armed force in Europe 
and to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military 
power there (#13). NATO ministers were willing to contemplate the 
restructuring of their forces but wished to see these 
'highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders 
will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to 
repond to a cr1s1s. It will rely increasingly on 
multinational corps made up of national units.' (#14-
emphasis added) 
They wanted to maintain 'an appropriate mix of nuclear and 
conventional forces, based in Europe ... kept up to date where 
possible' (#15), though NATO 'will never be the first to use force' 
(#5) and the Allies aimed to reduce their reliance on nuclear 
weapons (#17 & #20). NATO intended to propose the elimination of 
nuclear artillery shells from and the reduction of short-range 
nuclear forces in Europe (#16 & #17). 
Danish representatives were very supportive of the London 
Declaration as it contained a number of positive elements for them. 
First, it was .strongly transatlantic, confirming the American 
commitment to the ·defence of Europe. Secondly, it not only promised 
the continuation of NATO, but talked about those aspects of the 
Alliance - its defensive nature, the promise never to use force 
first, and its developing political component particularly 
attractive to Denmark. Thirdly, the Declaration placed less 
emphasis on nuclear forces in Europe. Finally, there was a promise 
I 
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of future reliance on 'multinational corps made up of national 
units' (#14), for which the Danes - together with the West Germans -
felt they had provided the model in COMBALTAP. 
What might be the consequences of the implementation of the London 
Declaration for Danish defence and the British contribution? The 
Declaration promised a new allied strategy 
'moving away from "forward defence" where appropriate, 
towards a reduced forward presence and modifying 
"flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on 
nuclear weapons ... NATO will elaborate new force 
plans ... ' 
There is a strong argument that the move away from "forward defence" 
'where appropriate' directly affects the land defence of Denmark. 
The country is no longer a 'front-line' state and the set-piece 
battle for Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein, in which much of the 
Danish army and the UKMF was to be involved, is no longer a likely 
scenario for these forces. The revised NATO view - representing a 
political compromise has elements in common with the 
'just-in-case' outlook, such as the stress on the Alliance having 
mobile and flexible forces to repond to a crisis and on the ability 
to build up 'large forces if and when needed' (#14). The major 
difference between the two viewpoints is that the London Declaration 
outlines a wider concept of European security and the steps to be 
taken to achieve it. 
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Meanwhile those forces including British and Danish ones 
currently involved in the defence of West Germany are to be reduced 
and configured more defensively. It would make sense for the Danish 
forces - and those from Germany - to bear a large share of the 
proposed CFE reduction of tanks. Furthermore, there could be an 
increasing reliance in the area west of what used to be NATO's 
front-line on national units in multinational corps (#14). The 
Greenwood-Canby suggestion could fit the bill, with some of the 
Danish, German and British forces already utilised in BALTAP Command 
acting as a precursor for their 11 Shield 11 formations. 
The current danger is that national decisions will be made about 
forces in Europe which will then have 'knock-on' effects in other 
NATO captials. For example, the repatriation of US units may cause 
the German government to decide to reallocate its Sixth Division 
closer to the old Inner-German Border. This, together with the 
likely withdrawal of the UKMF's services, would seriously jeopardise 
the continuation of the Baltic Command, perhaps the best functioning 
example of NATO multinational forces thought so desirable by the 
London Declaration. The role of German, Danish, British, American 
and other forces in Germany and Denmark could be better examined in 
the light of the move to multinationalism, but this would suppose 
member states entering a bargaining round in NATO on such matters. 
As yet, no such willingness has been publicly expressed. 
Furthermore, there may seem little point in such discussions until 
J., 
I~ 
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NATO's national forces have recovered from their duties in the 
conflict against Iraq. 
One subsidiary aspect of the London Declaration that may get more 
attention is its positive reference to the European Communities 
(EC), and in particular to the move towards political union 
'including the development of a European identity in the domain of 
security'.#S3) The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought into play both 
the European Political Co-operation of the EC states and the Western 
European (WEU). While the Danish government has been content to see 
the role of European Political Co-operation be developed in the EC's 
diplomatic dealings with, for example, Middle East problems, there 
seems litte enthusiasm in Denmark (or in other European states) for 
this institution to be involved in the operative aspects of security 
policy, let alone in purely defence questions. Some West European 
countries have looked to the WEU to co-ordinate their operations out 
of the NATO area, for example in the Gulf naval patrols at the end 
of the Iran-Iraq War. In August 1990 a WEU Ministerial Meeting 
dealt with the military response of its members to Iraq's attack on 
Kuwait, and Denmark - for the first time - attended this gathering 
as an observer. This may be the sort of impetus needed for Denmark 
to consider WEU membership seriously, especially if countries such 
as Norway and Turkey were to join. For membership to be acceptable, 
the WEU would have to remain auxillary to NATO and not become a 
European rival, and its action would increasingly have to be seen in 
the context of a pan-European security regime.(B) 
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(v) The European collective security option is one that could grow 
out of the NATO London Declaration, which stated: 'the security of 
every state [in the new Europe] is inseperably linked to the 
security of its neighbours.'(#4) Collective security defines the 
nature of that link: it means that every state must come to the 
assistance of a state that is the victim of aggression and therefore 
every state could expect the support of the international community 
if it were ever attacked by an aggresor. This 'one for all and all 
for one' is advanced as a deterrent against aggression as well as an 
effective form of defence. It contrasts with NATO's collective 
defence which in reality has been directed against the Warsaw Pact 
and not against any aggressor, as in the case of a collective 
security system. 
Some commentators have suggested that the NATO collective defence 
arrangement should now be changed to a regional collective security 
system as the raison d'etre for the Alliance has disappeared (9). 
Furthermore, a number of East European states have already adopted 
the economic and political values of the West which would suggest 
that they are also ripe for a new security relationshiop with their 
Western counterparts. 
What consequences would such a move have for the defence of Denmark 
and for the United Kingdom? Danish defence would no longer be seen 
within the context of NATO but within a wider European collective 
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security grouping, preseumably based on a development of the CSCE. 
Though NATO might still exist as a political organisation, it would 
not have military significance for states such as Denmark which 
would not be part of a unified military structure. The European 
collective security organ may require to know from Denmark what 
contribution it would make when called upon to defend any member of 
the group against an aggressor. Denmark might provide a small 
volunteer army (also serving as a Danish contribution to UN 
peacekeeping), minimal air cover for the troops, and a specialist 
effort in an area of Danish comparative advantage, mine-laying and 
mine-sweeping. This would demand little from the United Kingdom, 
especially as Denmark - if attacked - would expect support from all 
members of the collective security system. However, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark might agree that the former extending its air 
defences out over Danish airspace could have mutual advantages. 
Whilst there are those in the Danish Radical Party and on the left 
of Danish politics who may consider a European collective security 
system (and a contribution to UN peacekeeping) as the ultimate aim 
of Danish defence, most recognise that, even given the comparatively 
favourable situation in Europe today, such a development is unlikely 
to occur in the near future. However, should a CSCE system emerge 
in the next decade and should NATO turn itself into a more political 
organisation, and should arms control, disarmament and confidence -
and security-building continue apace, then this model for Danish 
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defence may become more attractive. As such it is not necessarily a 
rival 'security future' to that laid out in the London Declaration. 
(vi) Another option is one of armed neutrality. Should NATO 
disappear (possibly because of the lack of a perceived threat), yet 
no alternative pan-European structure emerge, it may then be up to a 
small European state to arrange for its own security. Denmark might 
copy the Swedish- and Finnish models, although it has not the 
geo-strategic position of either. The aim would be to make an 
invasion of Danish territory not worth while in terms of gains 
versus losses. This can be done either by making the cost of the 
original invasion high in terms of losses of men and materiel, 
probably a difficult task for such a vulnerable state as Denmark, or 
by making the cost of occupation unacceptably high. That might be 
achieved by stressing the territorial defence aspects of the Danish 
armed forces and by training the population in guerilla warfare. 
Such a policy would be expensive and would be unlikely to attract 
the necessary public support in a prolonged period of peace. 
(vii) A further alternative would be for the Danes to take a 
positive decision to eschew military defence completely. The 
reasoning is not just that the traditional adversary is no longer 
perceived as a threat to the country and that no other state has 
taken its place. It would also involve a calcuation by a Danish 
government that whatever military threat might arise in the future 
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is incalculable now and thus cannot be prepared for in peacetime. 
Should a threat arise to Denmark, other states may well find it in 
their own interest to counter it (though not necessarily just on 
Denmark's behalf). In the meantime, the Danes would try to protect 
the core values of their society by social solidarity and political 
and economic means, as they did during the Second World War.(lO) 
The adoption of this alternative would mean the cutting of existing 
Danish military links with allies such as the British, though the 
United Kingdom might want to monitor closely the security situation 
of Denmark, as this could reflect adversely on its own defence. 
This option would have the support of pacifists and possibly some 
members of parties, such as the Radicals, traditionally hostile to 
military defence. 
(viii) Some of the above options might become more attractive if 
linked to a more positive concept, that of defining security in non-
military terms, especially if the emphasis was placed on 
environmental security (11). The reasoning here would be that the 
greatest threat to the Danish quality of life is an environmental 
one that, unlike its military counterpart, the Danes can do 
l something about. Conscription might be maintained but for Danish 
I 
I 
citizens - male and female - to undertake social action within their 
own country (similar to that already undertaken by present-day 
conscientious objectors), or to form environmentally active brigades 
(perhaps giving a new meaning to 'Green Berets') to serve in Denmark 
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or the Third World or Eastern Europe. The Social Democrat leader, 
Svend Auken, gave a hint of such ideas in a speech in August 1990 in 
which he foresaw a greater role for the armed forces in non-military 
activity such as dealing with environmental catastrophes.(12) 
The effect on the United Kingdom would be the same as any absence of 
a Danish military defence effort, but with one added complication. 
The Danish example might become attractive to an increasingly 
•green' electorate within Britain and the transference of what 
resources were remaining for defence to the support of 
'environmental security' might become a vote-winning platform. This 
would indeed be ironic: the end of the post-War security 
relationship between the two countries studied here would be a 
further diminution of the United Kingdom military defence effort 
through the triumph of ideas 'made in Denmark'. 
Conclusions 
Which of the above scenarios is most likely to emerge as the choice 
of a substantial section of Danish political life? The reliance of 
Danish security policy on outside factors as well as on domestic 
elements is self-evident. Currently, the main Danish concern must 
be that of an appropriate response to its new strategic situation. 
It is no longer a NATO "front-line" state; the traditional adversary 
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the Warsaw Pact - is fast disappearing, although the Soviet Union 
remains powerfully armed and politically unstable; and a unifed 
Germany has appeared on Denmark's southern border. The problem for 
Danish decision-makers is that they are faced with a mixture of the 
continuation of familiar threats (or, at least, ones that have the 
potential to threaten), an almost total lack of threats, and a 
number of possible new threats (increased terrorism, crises and war 
' 
in the Middle East, ethnic unrest and refugees in Europe, even the 
demands of a unifed Germany). They clearly do not have the 
resources or the willingness to cover all eventualities. 
However, they might be able to move toward a more-or-less optimal 
outcome. 
Of the eight scenarios mentioned above, the status-quo minus no 
longer appears either to address the new situation of Denmark or to 
attract significant political support. The • just-in-case • option 
may seem prudent in a period of great uncertainty, but it lacks 
vision and political support as a medium term strategy for dealing 
with Denmark's security problems. 
Whether any of the versions of a European security system was on 
offer would mainly depend on other states, though the Danish 
government can feed its preference into the international 
discussion. Of the three, the London Declaration Security System is 
already on the agenda plac0d there by the NATO Ministers - and 
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could muster considerable political support in Denmark ranging from 
those who would otherwise veer towards a 'just-in-case' solution to 
those that might prefer the Alternative European Security System. 
This latter choice is available within the Danish debate - it has 
been proposed by the Socialist Peoples Party - but will only become 
a serious contender within Denmark if it is strongly advocated, in 
preference to the London Declaration version, by the German Social 
Democrats. The European collective security model remains just that 
- a model for future consideration. 
The last thr~e choices - armed neutrality, no military defence or 
environmental security might be open to serious consideration in 
Denmark should no European system arise, and elements of the last 
mentioned may any how be seen more prominently on the political 
agenda in the 1990s. 
In summary, some form of European security system would help a small 
country such as Denmark maximise its security position in a period 
of uncertainty. Of the choices available, the London Declaration is 
the one most likely to be pursued currently by other European states 
and which could attract the greatest constituency within Denmark. 
What does this mean in defence terms for Denmark? In reality it 
must mean a recognition that, even more than before, Germany is the 
key for the defence of Denmark. It is difficult to perceive Denmark 
i l 
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being defended against any serious outside military threat that may 
arise without the assistance and participation · of Germany. 
Likewise, if Germany itself is not to be seen as a threat to small 
states such as Denmark, it is essential that a unifed Germany 
remains democratic and part of the panoply of European institutions 
such as the EC, WEU, NATO and the CSCE - that help to maintain 
democracy and economic success, as well as reassure other European 
states about the future of Germany. 
This does not mean that Danish armed forces should become an 
appendage of those of the united Germany. The London Declaration 
provides at least a framework for a more multinational approach to 
security in the area of and around Germany. A suggestion has been 
made as to how this might be filled out. The consequences for 
Danish forces would be that their dispositions would be similar to 
those at present. They might fall in number and lose some tanks and 
fighter aircraft. The main difference would be that the ground 
forces and air cover would be part of a wider NATO configuration 
aimed at the security of Germany and Denmark, which would still 
include a contribution by the United Kingdom. Part of this could be 
~he use of United Kingdom, Danish and German forces as a mobilisable 
shielding formation along a second line of defence. As both a 
trusted ally and a contributor to Danish and German defence, the 
United Kingdom is in a good position to sponsor a feasibility study 
of such ideas. 
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Such a security system has the virtue that it can be "cranked up" 
should a threat emerge but it can also be run down should Europe 
truly become a 'security-community' within which there is no 
expectation of the use of force in relations between states. Under 
those conditions, the defence structure can be changed to suit 'one 
of the other models which, at the moment, do not seem realisitc 
choices. 
1
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